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the source of her actions in a certain way” (p. 12); and third, to develop an
argument “that agents have free will only if they are the sources of their
choices in a certain way, and being the source of one’s actions in this way
requires the falsity of causal determinism” (p. 16). Despite the worries outlined above, I think it is clear that Timpe fulfills all three of his goals, and
that’s an impressive accomplishment for a mere 121 pages of text. I commend his book to you.

The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism, by
J. P. Moreland. London: SCM Press, 2009. Pp. xiii + 180. ₤40.00 (paper).
C. STEPHEN LAYMAN, Seattle Pacific University
J. P. Moreland’s The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (hereafter, Imago Dei) is a sustained critique of naturalistic views of the human person. Moreland argues that naturalism fails to explain (or provides inferior explanations for)
consciousness, free will, rationality, the self, and moral value; theism offers a better explanation in every case. Given the number and complexity
of the arguments in Imago Dei, the summary which follows is inevitably
highly selective.
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of consciousness? First,
those naturalists who deny property dualism run up against strong arguments, since mental states plausibly have a number of features that physical states lack, including: (1) being directed toward an object, (2) being private, (3) being non-spatial (i.e., neither extended in nor located in space),
and (4) having a felt-quality (e.g., what it feels like to be in pain). Second,
those naturalists who accept property dualism have difficulty providing
adequate explanations of mental states for such reasons as:
1. The “regular correlation between types of mental states and physical states seems radically contingent” (p. 25). Why is pain (rather
than a feeling of joy) correlated with C-fiber firing? And how can
naturalists explain the apparent possibility of “zombie” worlds and
of “inverted qualia” worlds?
2. Given that naturalists accept the causal closure of the physical domain, and given the irreducibility of mental states, naturalists must
accept epiphenomenalism; but epiphenomenalism is surely false
since mental causation seems undeniable.
3. Evolutionary explanations of the mental don’t work because “the
functions organisms carry out consciously could just as well have been
done unconsciously.” And “it is the output [bodily movement], not
what caused it, that bears on the struggle for reproductive advantage” (p. 26).
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Theism provides better explanations in each case. For example, the connections between the physical and the mental are contingent because they
are due to free choices God makes, as Creator. (By contrast, according to
many naturalists, if two worlds are physical duplicates, then they must
also be psychological duplicates.) Furthermore, unlike naturalists, traditional theists reject the causal closure of the physical domain. Finally,
theists are free to supplement evolutionary explanations with appeals to
divine purpose.
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of free will? In a nutshell, because the libertarian view of free will is far more plausible than
the compatibilist view and because naturalism comports poorly with libertarianism. Here Moreland quotes well known naturalists (such as John
Searle) who grant the intuitive plausibility of the libertarian view, while
admitting that naturalism excludes it. Moreland offers several reasons
for thinking that free actions are “virtually impossible to reconcile with
the naturalist standpoint” (p. 44), among them: (A) Free action requires
a categorical ability to do otherwise—a mere conditional ability (i.e., one
would refrain from the act if one wanted or intended to) is not enough.
For naturalists, however, particular events are subsumed under laws of
nature, and so “the physical conditions are sufficient to determine or fix
the chances of the next event” (p. 48). And there seems to be no room for
a categorical power to do otherwise in this law-governed scheme. (B) Libertarian free will involves (irreducibly) mental causation. And Moreland
employs Kim’s exclusion argument to show that naturalism apparently
rules out causation by (irreducibly) mental factors. (Roughly, every physical event—and hence every brain event—has a physical cause. But brain
events do not have two causes, i.e., an irreducibly mental cause in addition to a physical cause.)
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of rationality? (A) As
noted above, naturalists falter in explaining free will, and there “are several aspects to human reasoning that require free will” (p. 73). “Acts of
deliberation presuppose that there is more than one possible conclusion
one could reach, but if determinism is true, there is only one outcome
possible” (p. 74). Moreover, our logical conclusions are ones we ought
to draw and ought implies can (p. 74). (B) Naturalists have difficulty accounting for a priori knowledge and for knowledge via introspection.
For example, naturalism is unable to account for a suitable relation between the epistemic subject and the abstract objects of a priori knowledge,
which are causally inert (p. 78). Also, introspection requires a relationship between the mental state and the introspecting subject which naturalism has difficulty explaining: Assuming the relationship is causal, it
seems to be mental-physical or mental-mental, and naturalism falters in
explaining such relations. (C) “Rational deliberation exhibits irreducible
teleology” (p. 83) since a conclusion is the end for the sake of which one
reasons. But how can teleological explanations of deliberation be reconciled with a scheme in which efficient, event-event causation is the

BOOK REVIEWS

245

underlying reality? (D) Most if not all mental states are intentional, i.e.,
of or about something (e.g., a thought about triangles). Naturalists often
try to reduce intentionality to causal relations of input and output, but
Searle’s famous Chinese Room argument shows that such attempts fail
(p. 93). (E) Assuming that brain-events are governed by laws of nature,
“there is no room for the presence of one thought (e.g., if P then Q and P)
to be responsible for the occurrence of a later thought (e.g., Q), given the
dependence of the mental on the physical and the causal closure of the
physical” (p. 95).
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of the self? (A) Our
direct awareness of ourselves indicates that “body switch cases are perfectly possible” (p. 111) and so is disembodied survival. Physicalist views
of mind appear unable to account for such possibilities. (B) Even if we set
aside the possibility of disembodied existence, it remains possible that I
exist but my body does not. For example, the following scenario is metaphysically possible:
I continue to read the paper throughout a process during which each macropart of my body is replaced by others in a microsecond and the original
parts are annihilated. If the process occurs rapidly, my body will not continue to exist but I do since I continue to read the paper (p. 116).

So, possibly I exist when my body does not, and hence I am not identical
to my body.
(C) Moreland is in sympathy with an argument advanced by Stewart
Goetz: While every physical body is essentially a complex entity (i.e., one
having separable parts), I am essentially a simple entity (i.e., one having
no separable parts). So, I am not identical with my (or any) physical body
(p. 118). Moreland grants that this argument leaves open the possibility
that a person “is identical with a proper part of his body that is an atomic
simple” (p. 118), but ultimately concludes that this possibility is not very
plausible.
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of moral value? Of
course, many naturalists deny that there are objective moral values. But
even naturalists who accept “a sort of moral Platonism such that various
value properties are universals and, as such, simply part of the furniture of
the world, [have] . . . no explanation whatever as to why these properties
were ever exemplified” (p. 147). For example, how is it that evolutionary
mechanisms have produced animals that have a high, intrinsic, and equal
value? To claim that such “intrinsic value properties supervene upon human biology is just an assertion that names the problem to be solved, it is
not a solution” (p. 148).
As regards the content of morality, it “would seem that naturalism most
naturally implies a consequentialist evolutionary ethical understanding
of moral action; specifically, a view of moral action as a means to reproductive success” (p. 151). But this understanding of morality is highly
problematic. For one thing, it would seem to be open to the “publicity
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objection,” i.e., ironically, teaching it “would not promote reproductive
advantage” (p. 152).
Naturalism gives an inadequate response to the question, “Why be
moral?” Ultimately, the best answer the naturalist can give is egoistic: one
should be moral “just in case it is in one’s best interests to be so” (p. 156).
Theists have a better answer: One should be moral “because the moral law
is true and is constituted by the non-arbitrary commands of a good, just,
wise, loving God, or because the moral law is grounded in the way we
were designed by such a God to function properly” (p. 156).
Finally, evolutionary naturalism apparently removes any ground for
believing that humans have a high, intrinsic, and equal value, for, from
this perspective, there is no sharp distinction between humans and other
animals, and whatever grounds human dignity (e.g., intelligence) apparently comes in degrees, thus undermining equality.
Imago Dei is a bold philosophical exploration of the theological claim
that humans are created in the image of God. It is impressive in its range
and in its synthesis of philosophical difficulties for naturalism. I am, however, inclined to think that the author overestimates the force of his arguments on a few points. Let me offer two illustrations. First, consider the
claim that naturalists cannot explain why certain brain states (e.g., C-fiber
firings) are correlated with certain mental states (pains). Assuming this is
so, what explanation can theists offer? The appeal to free divine creative
activity would explain the contingency of such correlations (assuming
they are contingent), but it does not tell us why God chose to link C-fiber
firings with pains, rather than, say, with the taste of chocolate. So, it’s not
clear to me that such correlations are something theists can explain better
than naturalists can.
Second, are the proffered theistic answers to “Why be moral?” clearly superior to possible naturalistic answers? For example, consider the
claim that one should be moral because “the moral law is true and is
constituted by the non-arbitrary commands of a good, just, wise, loving
God” (p. 156). Why couldn’t a naturalist, with about equal plausibility,
claim that one should be moral simply because the moral law is true?
Of course, many naturalists would not give this answer, because they
deny that there is any objective moral truth. But many naturalists affirm that there is objective moral truth, and they could give this answer.
(Moreland does raise important questions about naturalistic attempts to
explain the presence of objective moral truth, but I take it that the “Why
be moral?” issue is supposed to be a problem independently of the question of moral truth.)
In conclusion, Imago Dei makes a helpful contribution to the dialogue
between theism and naturalism by providing a comprehensive theory
of the human person that highlights difficulties for naturalism. While
Imago Dei may not always be convincing, it takes the reader on a very
thought-provoking excursion through complex territory in the philosophy of mind.

